

The Radical Right in Power? – The Impact of Jobbik on Legislation in Hungary (2010-2014)

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Abstract

In our study we aimed to find the answer to the research question whether the widely spread assumption in the Hungarian political public opinion that the governing Fidesz eventually accomplished the strategic proposals of the radical right-wing party, Jobbik was valid or not. In our analysis we relied on the results provided by the database of the Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project. In the first part of our analysis by applying the saliency approach we concluded that the agenda of legislation reflects more of the priorities of Jobbik than of the governing party. On the other hand, our analysis based on the pledge approach lead us to the conclusion that the most significant pledges of the governing party were fulfilled, rather than the key elements of the Jobbik manifesto. Therefore, Jobbik does have an impact on the agenda of legislation, but the governing party has a preference for its own pledges when it comes to fulfilment.

Introduction

Following the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, many unfounded and unproven claims concerning Jobbik have appeared. These statements have been formed as related to former party preferences of Jobbik voters, citing either the collapse of MSZP or the increasingly radical rhetoric of Fidesz as reasons for the strengthening of the party. A shift has occurred as a result of the study of Gergely Karácsony and Dániel Róna, published in 2010, in which it was established that the basis for the rise of Jobbik is manifold: understanding of social characteristics and attitudes of the voters and the relation of these to party preferences, along with knowledge of actual offerings and political agenda-setting is to be taken into consideration in order to provide an explanation (Karácsony – Róna 2010). In our study, we intend to contribute to a scientific explanatory process similar to the one mentioned above by assessing the validity of a widely shared assumption that the governing party, Fidesz, in significant issues for Jobbik, eventually accomplished the proposals of the latter.

In other words: based on the 2010 election manifesto of Jobbik and Fidesz and in the light of data on legislation we aim to find the answer to the research question whether the key pledges of the Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary, who were having their first term of elected parliamentary representation, or of the governing Fidesz has shaped the legislative process more.

Researching election promises is usually based on the election manifesto of a specific party. Adding more depth to it, this can be expanded by other tools which public policy manifestos can be emphasised through – among such tools can be media appearances, campaign events, or brochures and advertisements. Unfortunately, examination of the latter ones needs to be eliminated for various reasons to be revealed later. Therefore, the focus of our examination will be on manifestos “*Radikális változás*” [Radical Change], by Jobbik, and “*Nemzeti ügyek politikája*” [Politics of National Issues], by Fidesz, respectively – the relation of these to the laws implemented during the 2010-2014 parliamentary term will be outlined. Hungarian databases of Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) and the coding of the two election manifestos, executed by ourselves, are used in the examination.

Following the introduction, various theoretical approaches regarding the impact of the radical right will be tackled, which do not prove to be universally applicable models of explanation despite being valid one by one. Consequently, it is not from a universal viewpoint, rather from that of the study’s topic that the theoretical framework will be established, with references to its validity at times in relation to Jobbik. Prior to introducing the methodology of our research, antecedents of dealing with this same topic in Hungary will be shown; then, following the methodological part, results gained from the database of Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project are to be discussed, thus providing an answer to the research question of our study.

Theoretical approaches regarding the impact of the radical right

Although sharing a similar profile, European radical parties have different social bases. Although in numerous countries, losers of modernisation, those of a lower status turn to the radical right, it cannot be stated that there is a ubiquitous correlation between class and voting behaviour in their case. In this respect, Jobbik would be found in a middle position until 2014, since those at the bottom as well as at the top of society rejected the party, its voters being fairly well-educated rather than the typical poor. At the same time, the party was particularly popular with those having experienced unemployment. This area counted as one of the most prominent agendas and instances of the legislative work of Jobbik during the time specified, and most of the suggestions posed by them considering resolving the situation of borrowers of foreign currency loans would, indeed, appear in legislation after 2010. Previously the likeliness of voting for Jobbik was increased by the fact that the elector had a foreign currency loan or not (Enyedi – Fábíán – Tardos 2014), even though foreign currency loans and the case

of the debtors was not part of the election manifesto in the period we examined. This area in the period considered formed a significant part of Jobbik's agenda and legislation and most of their proposals for solving the problem of foreign currency debtors partly appeared in their legislative actions and proposals after 2010.

The attempts at offering an explanation for the strengthening of radical right-wing parties differ from one another in case of the approaches of demand, and supply, respectively. When examining radical right-wing parties and party families, this difference obviously stems from the existence of numerous characteristics which are characteristic of most parties, but singular approaches alone cannot serve as explanations for the strengthening or significant success of a certain party. According to the literature, the current direction of the approach of supply is that of being leader-centred that emphasises the hierarchical structure and the according portrayal of the politics of radical parties. On the basis of this, idiosyncratic subcultural political socialisation and an according political recruitment, also, strong cohesion within the party authorised by charisma and a "top-down" way of decision-making can result in the effective functioning of the party (Bos 2011 et al, de Lange – Art 2011). Media (Ellinas 2010), later on, the strengthening of internet-based politics and its utilisation (Róna – Sörös 2012) can have a role in the rise of radical right-wing parties. The strength of the organisational sphere and the establishment of a new media network proves to be a deciding factor in effective messaging, and although not an exclusive explanatory principle, it is an effective way of displaying the party's issues. The model of demand traditionally draws upon the close relation of social-demographic attitudinal variables and party preference (Krekó – Juhász – Molnár 2011). Similarly to Dániel Róna, we cannot regard outside macro factors and the existence of economic and social processes favourable to the party as satisfactory explanatory principles either in case of the strengthening of Jobbik, as the prominence of certain topics was a prerequisite for the strengthening of Jobbik.

From the viewpoint of the questions examined, the theoretical framework of the rivalry between mainstream party Fidesz and niche party Jobbik has to be addressed. The study is concerned with the impact of the latter type on the former one, presupposing a characteristic trait of a niche party, namely that it introduces a political issue presented on the agenda by no other party before – for instance, that of public safety, in this case. This does not mean that a niche party should be considered as revolving around one issue exclusively, but the example of the rise of Jobbik demonstrates a typical characteristic of niche parties: prioritisation of

economic issues is uncommon, much rather issues dealing with traditional cracks and class boundaries (Meguid 2005, Wagner 2012).

Three approaches by a mainstream party towards a niche party exist: opting for an adversarial strategy, the former does not appropriate the issue raised by the latter, but designs a divergent, independent view on it. In the case of a mainstream party opting for an accommodative strategy, it aspires to appropriate the issue, assumes a similar opinion. As opposed to this, by adopting a dismissive strategy, it entirely refuses to react to the issue and ignores it (Meguid 2005)

Through the examination of 193 parties from 25 countries, James Adams and Zeynep Somer-Topcu have come to the conclusion that parties react to the public policy position of their rivals in a way that at the time of the upcoming elections, they approximate their viewpoint to that of their rivals at the time of the preceding elections. Besides, in the case of parties belonging to the same ideological branch, the possibility of reacting to one another increases (Adams – Somer-Topcu 2009).

For our topic, it is important to mention the theory of the supply model known as the spatial model, which examines the rise of the radical party in relation to its position to other parties. Róna discusses in detail the relevance of applying the spatial model to Jobbik and the debate on the basic logic of the spatial model. In this case, the viewpoint has to be noted according to which a leading right-wing party facilitates the strengthening of the radical right-wing party by shifting towards the edge of the political sphere, thus rendering its viewpoints legitimate and mobilising its supporters; then, to gain greater support, shifts towards the centrum again (Róna 2014). In this case, taking into consideration certain issues raised by Jobbik, as well as giving attention to them to them strengthens the relevance of this viewpoint.

Finally, the concept of issue ownership presupposes that parties claim certain issues for themselves, the ownership and prioritisation of which being the primary condition of success. The reason for this is that voters decide on a certain party on grounds of how much the party in question seems to be competent regarding the handling of a policy or problem. In this model, parties themselves aspire to mobilise their voters focusing on the issue claimed for themselves, continually emphasising its importance over issues they cannot handle effectively enough, thus minimise the importance of (Klüver – Sagarzazu 2015). Therefore, in this case, making a decision means opting for the party most capable of handling a certain issue, and if one considers the relation of Jobbik to the issue of “gypsy crime” and public safety, it seems

to be a well-founded statement to pronounce that supposedly, the party has intentions stemming from this model.

As opposed to the previously mentioned “top-down” way of organisation, the model of “riding the wave” presupposes that parties prioritise issues voters are most intrigued by, therefore rendering the latter group the ones who decide on issues to be raised, from below. Accordingly, favourites to win elections are those with ownership of the issues thus determined (Ansolabehere – Iyengar 1994, Klüver – Sagarzazu 2015). Since Jobbik failed to form a government, this explanation is valid only inasmuch as their popularity has proved to grow among people with foreign currency loans, after having embraced their issue. As follows from the concept, it has to be added that parties most likely to achieve success are those with candidates who are direct, well-informed, and seem to be ready, in the voters’ view, to react and to embrace issues. This latter group, thus, perceives the party as one dealing with actual and vital topics of their interest, as one willing to react to public policy priorities concerning citizens – radical parties are, indeed, capable of portraying themselves as such (Griffith – Glennie 2014).

Antecedents of the research

Besides the above mentioned modes of research, the utilisation of CAP databases is not unprecedented either when examining the impacts of radical right-wing parties. When investigating the impact of Greek party Golden Dawn –an outspoken far-right force, and much more radical than Jobbik– on the rest of the Greek parties, it was found that apart from economic matters, in relation to which the priority of the then-ongoing Greek crisis cannot be disregarded, other topics of the radical right exerted no influence on the profile of the other parties (Halikiopoulou – Nanou – Vasilopoulou 2015). For reasons hinted at earlier when introducing the theoretical framework and as a result of Hungarian idiosyncrasies, the same cannot be said of Jobbik: different results and modes of action are to be encountered.

Examination of impact of Jobbik is not unprecedented in Hungary; Dániel Róna’s analysis focused on the party’s attempts at thematisation. He regarded speeches performed in the parliament as the main tool of displaying the party’s issues, since in those situations, there occurs no compulsion on the speaker’s side to react. Apart from speeches from parliamentary group leaders, demonstrations and events, yearly assessment speeches of the leader of the party, and the party’s official magazine (Barikád [Barricade]) also constituted part of his

inspection. An emphasis was laid on the problem of borrowers of the foreign currency loans (Róna 2014).

Investigating Jobbik's activity in the parliament, considering interpellations, instantaneous questions and bills submitted, Hungarian think-tank Republikon Intézet found that issues related to public safety and the Romani were common; at the same time, speeches of members of the parliamentary group were characterised by mentions of economic issues (Republikon 2011).

Speaking of the issues of the Romani and of public safety, respectively, after 2010 in relation to the stance of radicals, Róna detected an accommodative strategy in the case of MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], in the case of LMP [Politics Can be Different], pointed out a viewpoint opposing that of Jobbik. In the case of the government, laws and their modifications were perceived as indicators when examining the impact on governmental measures, and Róna came to the conclusion that excluding the impact of Jobbik would render discussion of the governmental imposing of public safety issues meaningless. He is sceptical about Jobbik's impact as regards issues of the symbolic and economic kind – the case of borrowers of foreign currency loans being an obvious exception in respect of the latter. Róna emphasised that even in case of finding a state of equality and agreement, causality cannot be proven.

In the following sections, a methodology will be shown that was used to provide an answer to our research question, and that is different from the ones used before. However, it has to be noted that by impact, we mean the nature of an issue rather than its quality; also –similarly as seen in Róna's piece– in our case, it cannot be determined in a clear-cut manner either which decisions have come into being as a result of the impact of Jobbik – since causality might be influenced by many factors (such as the agenda of politics and media) outside of the ones involved.

Methodology of the research

Although Jobbik earned its first mandate in 2004 due to Attila Kőrömi withdrawal the caucus of Fidesz, it was not until 2010 that its first elected representatives obtained a place in the parliament. It is from 2006 that the media presence of the party's politicians can be regarded as considerable, thus their impact exercised on the government dates from after that time.

Since having no representation between 2006 and 2010 (and scarcely having any following the 2009 Elections to the European Parliament), Jobbik had little chance of displaying its viewpoint and suggestions within the legislation. Nevertheless, after 2010, it would become one of the most active parliamentary groups, passing more than three thousand bills and parliamentary questions. In the upcoming section, our examination will be centred on this parliamentary term of 2010-2014.

There is a multitude of ways which a party can enunciate its messages through; however, the most encompassing overview of its public policy profile is offered by its election manifesto, and with a major election approaching, since 2009, Jobbik would prepare a most detailed set of plans, indeed. Earlier, the ideological and public policy profile of Jobbik has been investigated by András Bíró-Nagy and Dániel Róna through the content analysis of a number of documents: the Founding Statement from 2003, the 2007 Gábor Bethlen Programme, and the 2010 Election Manifesto, also including the results of a research on representatives by Magyar Választáskutatási Program [Hungarian Election Studies Project] from 2010 and those of a survey of the population before the elections. Nine issues have been chosen to serve as a basis for analysis: addiction to a strongly established order, anti-elitism, the Romani issue, nationalism, religiousness, anticommunism, economic policy, the relation with globalisation and the EU (Bíró-Nagy – Róna 2011). In our study, a different profiling is utilised, that is, one corresponding to the public policy codebook of CAP; hereby, it also has to be added that the two are only partially overlapping. In our system, there is no corresponding nomination for the concepts of anti-elitism, nationalism, and the relation with globalisation, while the other areas can be, either as sub-categories (such as anticommunism) or in their entirety (such as economic policy), inserted into the coding system of CAP as well.

It is known that election manifestos are restricted: they are not continuous, are prepared only for elections occurring in regular intervals; hence, are not fit for offering immediate reactions to the latest political developments. To compensate for this quality, other agenda setting tools of Jobbik could be examined, for which there are various ways. The media empire of Jobbik has ownership of a nationwide circulated magazine (Barikád), but has none of any television or radio channel, or daily paper. A problematic feature is that the structure of the party's media empire is so distinct from those of other parties that a comparison between them becomes virtually impossible; therefore, the examination of it has to be eliminated. During a term, demonstrations organised by a party can constitute a main element of its communication. Jobbik often uses this political tool, however, their examination would pose

considerable methodological problems – for instance, on what basis should they be selected for analysis, or how the speeches given there could be accessed – also, they are not adequate platforms for delivering complex messages.

Examining such an active party, the analysis of its activity in the parliament might be a good approach. At the same time, the question arises as to how independent this activity is, and to what extent it is a reaction to that of other parties, or to events occurring independently of the political parties. An additional problematic feature is the comparability with the party's manifesto, and the high number of interpellations lacking public policy-related content (having party politics content). The above activities are all under the strict control of the party. It might be subject of interest what suggestions politicians of Jobbik have formed as a reaction to others' inquiries. There is a scarcity in this respect because of the media erecting a cordon sanitaire around the party during the era of 2010-2014, thus limiting their opportunities of speaking: their addresses were few and temporary, or available in the press of the party, being mainly for the purpose of self-promotion rather than being actual reactions. Our examination, therefore, is reduced to the analysis of the election manifesto of Jobbik.

Since no party exists in a vacuum, Jobbik cannot be examined by itself either. Based on our theoretical approach, the other party examined is mainstream Fidesz. The latter, as a party having obtained supermajority in the term, obviously counts as the most prominent participant considering the shaping of public policy. Its relation to Jobbik helps explore the dynamics of the relationship between a mainstream and a niche party in Hungary. As the source of the examination of Fidesz, we have chosen "*Nemzeti ügyek politikája*" [Politics of National Affairs], also completed in 2010.

Impact of a party on politics can be described in more ways. The alteration in the messages formulated by other parties, as well as the media agenda can be analysed. Since our primary scope of interest is the party's impact on public policy, as a first step, it is worth scrutinising how their activity can be detected in the light of laws enacted. A legislative level of national relevance has to be targeted (as opposed to that of councils), one that is also suitably stable and can be overviewed (as opposed to ministerial decrees), is fairly easy to modify and governs a great deal of affairs thoroughly (as opposed to the Constitution), and the content of which is easy to comprehend (as opposed to various budgets). Laws meet these above requirements, thus bills accepted between 2010 and 2014 build the core of our examination.

The party's promises regarding its activity in the parliament for the period examined in this study are incorporated in its 2010 election manifesto entitled "*Radikális változás*" [Radical Change] (Jobbik 2010). Manifestos were coded based on the public policy codebook of CAP Hungary. Agreement on the unit of coding was a result of prior resolution on our side. Since one sentence is related to more public policy areas in some of the cases, or in others, more sentences elaborate on a single issue, coding based on sentences was discarded. Instead, a method based on statements was chosen, that is, one piece of text, comprising of one paragraph at most, forming one statement about one issue would be assigned a code. In case of a piece of text incorporating more issues, it would be assigned the codes of all the issues incorporated.

It was not intended to entirely exclude either of the two branches of studying election promises also used in Hungarian political science (Soós – Körösi 2013; Soós 2015). Consequently, it was the unification of the two that would become our resolution: we examined on the basis of both pledge approach and saliency approach whether laws enacted between 2010 and 2014 had matched the initiations of the two parties.

The first step of our examination is to clarify the priorities –determined beforehand– of which political actor can be traced in the eventual legislation. Saliency approach serves the measurement of this factor. Public policy components of Fidesz's and Jobbik's manifestos coded through the use of the above mentioned methods are compared to those enacted during the second Orbán government.

It is necessary to draw the attention to the fact that the impact is not limited to laying emphasis on strengthening certain public policy issues: success of a party is obvious only if suggestions determined by it evolve into actual laws. Therefore, the second part of our examination investigates the realisation of the most prominent, any sort of public policy-related initiations of Jobbik and Fidesz.

We are about to examine the fulfilment of the pledges communicated by the two parties in the light of the pledges identified in the party platforms. We have identified the ten key issues in the manifestos of both parties. We have done so based on the pledge approach (Mansergh – Thomson 2007) and selected the ten most recurring pledges in the party platforms. In each case it was easy to determine what these pledges referred to as well as what government activity they proposed. Despite the high number of occurrences, those pledges which could

hypothetically be tested, but due to the nature of their fulfilment, they would require a complex public policy analysis, have not been included in our investigation.

The actual implementation of testing has been conducted considering legislation adopted between 2010 and 2014. We have determined three criteria to test pledge fulfilment: fulfilled, unfulfilled and partially fulfilled. By the last one we mean pledges which have clearly been made in the party manifesto but their implementation has not been carried out completely, thus they may not be regarded as fulfilled. Upon assessing fulfilment we have decided against quantification in percentages, therefore the assessment of fulfilment depends on the subjective judgement of the assessor in this case. The reason for this decision was partly the fact that in several cases the degree of fulfilment would be hard to define. Neither have we examined if the pledges were fulfilled in a single output or by several steps taken by the government. As our primary focus was on pledges to take action we have to stress that legal sources e.g. laws passed by the Parliament in this case, were considered as fulfilled in our assessment and the conditions were regarded as satisfactory. Consequently, while identifying and testing the key pledges we have learnt that to what proportion and degree were the most significant pledges of Jobbik and Fidesz fulfilled through the legislative process in the parliamentary term of 2010-2014.

The relation between priorities outlined by Jobbik and Fidesz and laws enacted

Looking at the list of public policy priorities described in the manifestos of the two parties (see Table 1), it is apparent that Jobbik prepared a more detailed and elaborated piece of work; while Fidesz failed to include any bit of six of the twenty-one public policy issues, Jobbik only omitted the issue of immigration, irrelevant in Hungary until 2015. Touching on fewer issues led to the overrepresentation of issues important to the conservatives, while a more balanced approach can be seen as regards the radicals.

Table 1 – Emphasis on public policy topics in manifestos of Fidesz and Jobbik and in bills accepted between 2010 and 2014

	Fidesz	Jobbik	Bills accepted
Macroeconomics	15.023%	6.132%	10.012%
Civil Rights	0.939%	6.8%	4.773%

Health	23.005%	3.345%	3.027%
Agriculture	3.286%	5.017%	4.191%
Labour	2.347%	6.132%	3.376%
Education	2.817%	6.578%	3.027%
Environment	0.47%	1.784%	2.794%
Energy	2.347%	2.787%	3.26%
Immigration	0%	0%	0.931%
Transportation	0%	5.24%	4.889%
Law and Crime	14.085%	12.375%	11.525%
Social Welfare	7.042%	3.01%	2.561%
Housing	0.939%	4.682%	3.376%
Domestic Commerce	18.31%	3.456%	7.334%
Defence	0.47%	4.236%	2.561%
Technology	0%	3.122%	3.609%
Foreign Trade	2.347%	1.115%	0.699%
International Affairs	0%	7.804%	6.519%
Government Operations	6.573%	12.709%	15.832%
Public Lands	0%	2.23%	3.26%
Culture	0%	1.449%	2.445%

Note: Percentages mark the proportion of units assigned a code to the given public policy issue, per group

Examining the Euclidean distance between laws enacted and the issues of the Fidesz manifesto, it can be stated that its value outdoes that of the distance between bills acceted and the Jobbik manifesto – the former being 28.105, the latter only 8.759, respectively. With the same investigation applied to subtopics, similar results are obtained, though somewhat smaller in difference: the value of the distance between the Fidesz manifesto and laws enacted is 21.056, while that of the distance between the Jobbik manifesto and laws enacted equals 11.368. It is apparent, therefore, that emphases of the radicals on certain issues are more traceable in laws enacted later.

Since a number of public policy issues are missing from the Fidesz manifesto, the previous results might be misleading. Consequently, it is worth posing the question whether markedly

important issues to each party would actually become more significant than is usual in legislation as well. In the case of examining the average proportion of mentions, identical results are obtained: the more frequently mentioned public policy issues of both parties coincide with those regulated by more laws than on average, with a proportion of two-thirds in each case. In the case of Fidesz, the issues in question are macroeconomics, law and crime, domestic commerce and government operations; while those of Jobbik are macroeconomics, civil rights, transportation, law and crime, international affairs and government operations. Because of the different dispersions, this can mean a different number of elements. Thus, these same data are worth examining in comparison with issues of a proportion of mentions above the median, rather than the average. In this respect, Jobbik has significantly better results: 90% of their issues having a proportion of mentions above the median shows a similar result considering laws enacted (macroeconomics, civil rights, agriculture, labour, transportation, law and crime, housing, international affairs and government operations). In contrast, in the case of Fidesz, this proportion is only a slight majority (macroeconomics, agriculture, labour, law and crime, domestic commerce and government operations).

The situation is more obvious by regarding subtopics: then, regarding matters with a proportion of mentions above the average as well as those with a proportion of mentions above the median, the supremacy of Jobbik can be pointed out (in the case of the former: 50.82%, as opposed to Fidesz's 33.33%; in the case of the latter: 57.96%, as opposed to the governing party's 49.02%)

Therefore, we can declare that the priorities of Jobbik are more reflected in the agenda of legislation than those of Fidesz. The extent of the discrepancy between the emphases of the radicals and those of laws enacted is much smaller; also, their significantly important issues coincide in a greater proportion with those of legislation.

The fruition of the proposals developed by Jobbik and Fidesz

The length of the Fidesz party manifesto, despite the fact that it covered fewer public policy areas, included pledges which are easy to identify and prioritize. Firstly, we have selected the ten most recurring pledges in the manifesto, and subsequently we have examined their output, in these cases the realization through parliamentary activity was categorized as fulfilled, unfulfilled or partially fulfilled.

One of the longest and most prominent chapters in the party platform is the one outlining the vision of economic policy, this section includes the pledge of ensuring fair competition and monopoly regulation, which we considered fulfilled. A further pledge (2) in the chapter on economic policy, which is the most significant one in this chapter, is the one we identified as enterprise development. We have also regarded this as fulfilled, as well as the one on consumer protection (3), which aimed to protect Hungarian products. The following pledge concerning the (4) reform of law enforcement agencies has also been listed as realised, along with the ones (5) intending to strengthen the criminal code. The pledge of (6) “accountability and white-collar crime” has been regarded as partially fulfilled. Although there have been legislative actions taken in order to repress usury and financial crimes or crimes committed by public officials but the comprehensive reform, which has been highlighted in the manifesto, and the legislative action in order to increase transparency did not characterize this parliamentary term. The failure to reform (7) public procurement has clearly been one of the unfulfilled ones. Although this latter was one of the most crucial and reiterated pledges of the party platform, however, as we observed, only a minimal number of laws were passed and its goal remained unaccomplished. On the other hand, (8) the reform of public administration, which intended to increase government efficiency is apparently reckoned among the fulfilled ones due to significant changes in public administration and institutions regarding government offices and districts. The most frequent pledge in the 2010 election manifesto of Fidesz is the restructuring of (9) healthcare and related institutional reforms, however, judging by the laws passed, it is categorized as unfulfilled, as well as the (10) ideas on training and career prospects of healthcare employees.

The overall conclusion is that out of the ten most frequently mentioned, and consequently most important pledges of governing party in their less specific or detailed manifesto, compared to Jobbik’s, except for the reform and development of healthcare institutions, the other key pledges were fulfilled (partially in one case), and a number of them showed significant overlap with the issues outlined in manifesto of Jobbik, with the ones we identified as fundamental for the radical party, using our methodology.

In the case of the latter the laws concerning (1) the law enforcement agencies, (2) justice and courts were enacted. Furthermore, we may find that the pledges on (3) the support of ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders and (4) the reform of public education, as well as (5) sport promotion and financing also resulted in laws enacted. We have listed exactly the same

amount as unfulfilled out of the ten crucial pledges. Both (6) rural tourism and agritourism and the reform of (7) the tax system along with the salient pledge (8) on agricultural developments remained unfulfilled. The same applies to (9) the structural reform of local governments and authorities and additionally (10) the representation of ethnic minorities and the reform of related institutions.

Summary

In our study we investigated if it is a well-founded and valid assumption in the Hungarian political public opinion that the governing party, Fidesz, in significant issues for Jobbik, accomplished the proposals of the latter. In the first part of our analysis by applying the saliency approach we concluded that the most prominent ideas outlined in the party platform of the radicals resemble the laws subsequently passed in the proportions of issues. The agenda of the legislation reflects the priorities of Jobbik more that it does reflect in the case of governing party.

On the other hand, our analysis based on the pledge approach lead us to the conclusion that the most important pledges of the governing party were fulfilled, rather than the key elements of the Jobbik manifesto.

Even though the laws enacted greatly reflect the issues of Jobbik's public policy and its election manifesto, judging by the topics of public policy, by itself it does not imply that we may think of the elements of the Jobbik manifesto as fulfilled.

It is beyond doubt, in terms of the issues Jobbik stressed, such as law enforcement, public security and justice that we may speak of them as fulfilled pledges. There is a further shared feature of the governing party, which is in possession of the supermajority in the Parliament, and Jobbik in terms of their policy concerning ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders, which is an issue that fits perfectly into the Hungarian right wing setting as a shared feature.

However, beyond a few more less significant pledges of symbolic nature, Fidesz primarily fulfilled their own pledges, rather than the ones made by Jobbik. Consequently, in answer to the question in the title we may say that although Jobbik had an impact on the agenda of legislation, but the governing party has a preference for its own pledges in the way that it

related to a number of current social issues (e.g. law enforcement and public security) which were in accordance with the pledges by Jobbik eventually fulfilling them as well.

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